Neither Nevada nor Montana had a daytime speed limit before before the the 1974 action that made 55 the federal speed limit... and when the double nickel was repealed in 1995 reverted to the original anything goes at your own risk... Rudy, who is easily found by Google due to his frequent legal problems was driving 85 mph. No big deal, I do it a lot. But he was in some area with no shoulders, narrow, and had frost heaves (according to the asshole cop qwho had to come up with some reason to arrest the driver) was hilly and curvy, and the cop and the judge who dissented from the majority of the rest of the judges on the case found that driving over hills and around curves is inherently unsafe because you can't see over hills and around corners. Appearantly, the judge and cop never do so. Saints among us, just absolute angels. (assholes)
So driving on a 2 lane in March 1996, in a 1996 Camaro with new tires, in full daylight, with no traffic and no other discernable elements to make his 85mph "unsafe" caused an asshole cop to pull over the Camaro. Damn cliche!
You can read the entire case, and it's effing great to read the legal brief that explains the appeal to the speeding ticket based on the vague nature of unconstitutional, but in brief, the cop, and the effing attorney general of the state of Montana could come up with no reason to arrest and ticket the driver Rudy. SO :
¶ 28 It is evident from the testimony in this case and the arguments to the Court that the average motorist in Montana would have no idea of the speed at which he or she could operate his or her motor vehicle on this State's highways without violating Montana's “basic rule” based simply on the speed at which he or she is traveling. Furthermore, the basic rule not only permits, but requires the kind of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement that the due process clause in general, and the void-for-vagueness doctrine in particular, are designed to prevent. It impermissibly delegates the basic public policy of how fast is too fast on Montana's highways to “policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109, 92 S.Ct. at 2299, 33 L.Ed.2d at 228. -
¶ 29 For example, the statute requires that a motor vehicle operator and Montana's law enforcement personnel take into consideration the amount of traffic at the location in question, the condition of the vehicle's brakes, the vehicle's weight, the grade and width of the highway, the condition of its surface, and its freedom from obstruction to the view ahead. However, there is no specification of how these various factors are to be weighted, or whether priority should be given to some factors as opposed to others. This case is a good example of the problems inherent in trying to consistently apply all of these variables in a way that gives motorists notice of the speed at which the operation of their vehicle becomes a violation of the law. For all practical purposes, there was no other traffic on the highway at the time that Stanko was arrested, the condition of his vehicle was excellent, the surface of the road was dry, and the view ahead was unobstructed for a distance of at least 249 to 374 feet. On the other hand, the road was narrow, there were hills and curves which presented some degree of obstruction to the view ahead, and there was an occasional frost heave on the surface of the road. A reasonable speed under these circumstances would require a calculation of sight distances and stopping distances for the particular vehicle. These functions are normally provided by engineers employed by highway departments who then post signs indicating when it is necessary to reduce speed on a curve or hill crest in order to safely operate a motor vehicle. It is not the kind of decision that the average motor vehicle operator is qualified to make, and not the kind of decision that policemen or highway patrolmen should be called upon to make. Most importantly, for constitutional purposes, even if law enforcement officials were qualified to make those kinds of judgments, the statute would not satisfy the requirement that a motor vehicle operator of average intelligence know what conduct is prohibited and when his or her conduct is going to be subject to criminal penalties. -
I learned about this from Car and Driver magazine, August 2014, page 66. They really should have reprinted the legal brief, http://caselaw.findlaw.com/mt-supreme-court/1110919.html it's fantastic.
And so, they had to put up speed limits in Montana because cops aren't able to use better professional judgement to give speeding tickets.
So driving on a 2 lane in March 1996, in a 1996 Camaro with new tires, in full daylight, with no traffic and no other discernable elements to make his 85mph "unsafe" caused an asshole cop to pull over the Camaro. Damn cliche!
You can read the entire case, and it's effing great to read the legal brief that explains the appeal to the speeding ticket based on the vague nature of unconstitutional, but in brief, the cop, and the effing attorney general of the state of Montana could come up with no reason to arrest and ticket the driver Rudy. SO :
¶ 28 It is evident from the testimony in this case and the arguments to the Court that the average motorist in Montana would have no idea of the speed at which he or she could operate his or her motor vehicle on this State's highways without violating Montana's “basic rule” based simply on the speed at which he or she is traveling. Furthermore, the basic rule not only permits, but requires the kind of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement that the due process clause in general, and the void-for-vagueness doctrine in particular, are designed to prevent. It impermissibly delegates the basic public policy of how fast is too fast on Montana's highways to “policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109, 92 S.Ct. at 2299, 33 L.Ed.2d at 228. -
¶ 29 For example, the statute requires that a motor vehicle operator and Montana's law enforcement personnel take into consideration the amount of traffic at the location in question, the condition of the vehicle's brakes, the vehicle's weight, the grade and width of the highway, the condition of its surface, and its freedom from obstruction to the view ahead. However, there is no specification of how these various factors are to be weighted, or whether priority should be given to some factors as opposed to others. This case is a good example of the problems inherent in trying to consistently apply all of these variables in a way that gives motorists notice of the speed at which the operation of their vehicle becomes a violation of the law. For all practical purposes, there was no other traffic on the highway at the time that Stanko was arrested, the condition of his vehicle was excellent, the surface of the road was dry, and the view ahead was unobstructed for a distance of at least 249 to 374 feet. On the other hand, the road was narrow, there were hills and curves which presented some degree of obstruction to the view ahead, and there was an occasional frost heave on the surface of the road. A reasonable speed under these circumstances would require a calculation of sight distances and stopping distances for the particular vehicle. These functions are normally provided by engineers employed by highway departments who then post signs indicating when it is necessary to reduce speed on a curve or hill crest in order to safely operate a motor vehicle. It is not the kind of decision that the average motor vehicle operator is qualified to make, and not the kind of decision that policemen or highway patrolmen should be called upon to make. Most importantly, for constitutional purposes, even if law enforcement officials were qualified to make those kinds of judgments, the statute would not satisfy the requirement that a motor vehicle operator of average intelligence know what conduct is prohibited and when his or her conduct is going to be subject to criminal penalties. -
¶ 30 For these reasons, we conclude that that part of § 61-8-303(1), MCA, which makes it a criminal offense to operate a motor vehicle “at a rate of speed ․ greater than is reasonable and proper under the conditions existing at the point of operation” is void for vagueness on its face and in violation of the Due Process Clause of Article II, Section 17, of the Montana Constitution.
¶ 31 We do not, however, mean to imply that motorists who lose control of their vehicle or endanger the life, limb, or property of others by the operation of their vehicle on a street or highway cannot be punished for that conduct pursuant to other statutes, such as § 61-8-301, MCA (reckless driving), or § 61-8-302, MCA (careless driving). We simply hold that Montanans cannot be charged, prosecuted, and punished for speed alone without notifying them of the speed at which their conduct violates the law.
I learned about this from Car and Driver magazine, August 2014, page 66. They really should have reprinted the legal brief, http://caselaw.findlaw.com/mt-supreme-court/1110919.html it's fantastic.
And so, they had to put up speed limits in Montana because cops aren't able to use better professional judgement to give speeding tickets.
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